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0, Notations 
(n) refers· to a remark, [n] - to a reference. 
0,1. LP - the language of pure predicate calculus consists of 
(1) formal letters: P~, a. (i;j=0,1,2, •.• ) fo.r j-place predicates and 
l. l. 
for parameters (respectively) 
( 2) logical symbols: & , v, -+, ,, A ( for absurdity) , 3, V. 
( 3) auxiliary symbols: ( , ), x, x. ( i=0, 1 , .•• ) etc. 
l. 
LP is the cla~s of wff of LP, as defined e.g. in [Prawitz 65]. 
enlarges LP by the addition of formal letters fJ (i,j=0,1,2,.,.) 
l. 
for j-place functions. 
LPf includes accordingly some additional rules of formation. 
~A enlarges LP by the addition of numerals, 
~A - accordingly. 
LAf is the union of LA and Lpf' 
LAf - accordingly. 
0.2. I denotes the intuitionistic first-order predicate calculus, i.e.: 
the class IC rp generated by some formal system of axioms and rules 
of inference for intuitionistic first-order logic. 
C denotes the classical first-order predicate calculus. 
If c LPf and Cf - accordingly. 
IA c LA denotes intuitionistic, first-order arithmetics, i.e. - Heyting's 
arithmetic. 
CA denotes classical first-order arithmetics, as generated e.g. by 
adding to IA the rule of excluded-mid~le. 
IAf and CAf - accordingly. 
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0,3, In metalanguage we use formal letters as their own names. 
A, B. ( i=O ,-1 , ... ) etc. stands for formulas, !, B etc. - for occurrences 
l 
of formulas, 
A & B, Av B etc. are obvious (non-precise) abbreviations. 
A. stanµs for multiple conjunction. 
l 
The meanings of and, or,==>,~, .31, \;//(as metamathematical symbols) are 
obvious; X stands for (metamathematical) equality and we use the usual 
set-theoretic notation. 
A(!) is the formula which results by substituting Qin place of.!! in A 
If Sandy are sequences of occurrences of formulas, of the same length, 
A(S) is defined inductively in an obvious way. y 
0.4. I~ Tis some theory (e.g.: I. or CAf), then rT stands for 
provability in T, 
~rovT(x,A) means that xis a proof of A in T. 
'A~ denotes the Godel's number of A in some fixed enumeration, 
ProvT(x,1 A1 ) is the number-theoretical formalized form of frovT(x,A), 
i.e.: xis the Godel-number of a proof of A in T. 
M denotes some model (cf. 2 . 2). 
~ is the interpretation of A in M. 
M f A denotes satisfaction. 
If a model. M of Tis described in the language L, and Kc L, then Mc K 
means {AM I A E LT} c K. 
A8 stands for the Skolem-normal-form of A. 
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I. Metamathematical setting 
1. Intuitionistic validity 
1.0. Validity of a formula is intended to mean roughly "satisfaction in 
any situation". The three terms employed correspond to three mental 
constructions: 
1.0.1. "A mathematical situation" (a "model") means an interpretation 
of the formal letters of the language. For LP these are 
(i) The parameters, which are interpreted as a plurality, the 
universe of discourse. 
(ii) The predicates. (1) 
1,0.2. "Satisfaction" is defined inductively over logical complexity, 
and is thus redecud to an interpretation of the logical symbols 
(connectives and quantifiers). 
1,0,3, "Any" involves a notion of exhaustive variation over arbitr_ary 
models. 
1.1. For C (the classical first-order predicate calculus) the definition 
of validity is effected with the leading principles of apriority and 
maximality, that is: 
1 . 1 . 1 . ( i) "Plurality" is meant to be 
(i1) a given, completed set D 
(i2) in which every element is independent. (2) 
(ii) Ann-place predicate is interpreted as a subset S of Dn, 
conceived in the same way. 
1.1.2. Logical symbols are interpreted as well-defined and complete 
truth-functions. 
1.1.3. A model of a formula is thus a special definable kind of set, 
and the class of models can in turn become the domain of variation of a 
universal quantifier (of higher order). 
4 
1,2, An intuitionistic notion of validity for first-order formulas must 
be constructed with some cautions, 
1.2.1, Formal letters are interpreted by species, and therefore neither. 
are they delimited pluralities, nor their elements independent. 
1,2.2, In contrast to the classical case, where logical symbols are 
interpreted set~theoretically by two-valued truth functions, in in-
tuitionistic mathematics there is no universal predicative interpretation 
of logical symbols. Every assertion, e.g. A ➔ B or Vx A(a,x) is inter-
preted in a .structure as a construction in the form of a functional of 
higher order, which results from a genuine inspection£!!_ the structure, 
or which follows by a logical inference from such inspections. It is 
not given beforehand by the interpretation of the formal letters. 
1,2,3, Given a structure Mand a formula A, MF A is asserted therefore 
only by a "proof". If many formulas are considered, we can speak of 
a '.'theory". We must understand here "theory" in the most general sense; 
not as a formal theory generated by a formal system, but as a set of 
formulas shown to hold in the structure by any mean. The construction 
in the proef of Godel's incompleteness theorem provides an evident 
illustration of the difference between the two. Hence we have on the 
one hand the parallel of the classical notion of a model - a description 
by species of the domain and the predicates, and on the other hand a 
theory which refers to it. Contrary to classical metamathematics, 
where "true formulas in the model" are assumed to be defined a priori, 
and "true formulas" in general to be defined in a "closed" (set-theoretic) 
semantics,. we have here an owen concept of truth, which corresponds to 
intuitionistic view of mathematics in general. 
1.2.4. By this interpretation we have 
because the antecedent means that _it can be shown by some metamathematic~l 
argument that MF A is absurd. By 1.2,3 such an argument is accepted 
for the "theory" of M, and therefore M F 7 A. 
However, one does not have 
MF- A or M '7f A. 
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1.3, Could we incorporate the general notion of "model+ knowledge" 
into universal intuitionistic theory, as classical semantics is des-
cribed, in set-theorem (3)? 
We have seen that the theory of species does not provide such a general 
basis (4). The description of the model by species does not contain 
the "theory" of the model, because when speaking about the species, 
about "equality", "inclusion", "distinction" etc., one uses the terms 
"to construct" and "to establish" without specifying their meaning. 
Thus, in the theory of species a certain aspect of the process of con-
struction of mathematics is reflected, but its existence~ presupposes 
this construction. 
This emphasizes explicitly the argument of Brouwer that no set 
theory can serve as the basis of mathematics. Further, any attempt to 
have a closed universal description of semantics by some modified theory 
of species is contrary to this view of mathematics as an always-open 
investigation. 
1.4. Quantification over models 
1.4.1. A notion of validity involves a form of quantification V M ••• 
where M ranges over models. 
This can be understood as: "regardless of the model, " I Cl >II 0 In this 
case one disregards the exact meaning of concepts like "model" and 
"semantics" in general, and" •.. " is asserted on a logical basis (5). 
However, if we do assert such a thing, we assume it to be written-out 
already in the formal system we consider, and the problem of complete-
ness is precisely to check whether some new formula is valid by actual 
semantic considerations. 
In order to present a sensitive problem of completeness one has there-
fore to examine concretely the meaning of "VJ M ••• ". 
1.4.2, The first problem raisen in this is the general problem of 
quantification over a kind of objects in generation, like kinds of free-
choice sequences. Every model is in generation, at least the "theory" 
of the model is, and the quantification makes sense when we assert the 
matrix of the universal quantifier on the base of an "initial segment" 
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of its range. One would like, for instance, to have some bound on the 
complexity of "proofs" needeq. to assert for arbitrary M that M f= A, 
1.4-,3, But the main complication lies in the range of the quantifier, 
i.e. the "totality of models" itself. To see this we should keep in 
mind that we do not look for a general logical scheme, but on some 
formula asserted really by semantic considerations. Following 1,3 we 
are forced to reject the unlimited universal quantification altogether 
( 6). 
A meaningful solution for the problem of completeness can be, therefore, 
only a strong solution, on the ground of limited semantics (e.g.: 
intuitionistic analysis of a certain order). This is not necessarily an 
essential handicap, since the completeness of C (the classical predicate 
calculus) was proved in classical metamathematics by Hilbert-Bernays 
[39] on the ground of a very restricted semantic. 
1.4.4. The same situation arises when one likes to assert invalidity. 
The universal quantification is again the antecedent of an implication, 
and the non-validity can be concluded only in a strong form, on the 
basis of restricted semantic, 
1.4.5. The full meaning of this interpretation one has to give to 
validity in intuitionistic metamathematics appears when one tries to 
prove incompleteness. Here the universal quantification over models 
occurs positively. In principle, it cannot be asserted definitely about 
an unproved formula that it is valid, since we have rejected the concept 
of exhaustive validity. 
However, incompleteness may be established if one add new metasemantic 
principles. More specifically: if the interpretation of the formal 
letters is restricted (e.g., if function-symbols are interpreted as 
recursive functions), then completeness may conflict with known results 
about the restricte4 interpretation. In this sense we have a negative 
result in §4, where, besides Church's thesis, we have the principle of 4.2. 
1 .4.6. Since positive completeness results are difficult to be obtained 
one would like to strengthen the notion of validity in some way, as a 
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counterpart to 1,4.3. A step in this direction is the concept of 
"schematic validity" (Kreisel [58]). To obtain it one allows the 
species representing the formal symbols to depend on parameters. These 
become significant when they represent uncompleted objects, like law-
less sequences. In this case, in fact, one cannot fix the parameters 
and get a well-defined model; nevertheless the concept of validity, 
resulting by.universal quantification over the parameters, is well-
defined. The passage is analogous to that between lawless sequences and 
quantification over them (7). 
1.5. If one assumes that a model M of a theory T (in the language LT) 
is describable in some language L, then one would expect the following: 
(1) The formal letters of LT are interpreted by uniformly-recur-
sively defined combinations of L. 
(2) For the types of formal-letters of L, employed-in this des-
cription, L contains also proper names (constants), 
(3) The interpreting expressions of L combines like the represented 
formal letters of LT (e.g. : the representation of a ( 1 ) 0 functional 
acts as such). 
* 11 1,5,1, One may of course start with a formal theory T 1n Las the 
theory of the model", but one must keep in mind the possibility to 
enrich T* by metamathematical observations (cf, 1.2.3), 
2. Kinds of completness 
2.1. Classical assertion of semantic completeness reads 
( i) VM M I= A -= ]x!Prov(x,A). 
Already "formally" (i) splits into several variants, all equivalent 
classically, but not intuitionistically. 
The disjunctive form 
(ii) ~V M M I= A or 3lx!Prov(x,A) 
1s of no interest, since the intuitionistic interpretation of disjunction 
implies here a decision of I, which is absurd. 
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A weaker variant is the double-negation of (i), which is equivalent 
to the three forms 
(iii-1) VM M FA=:>~ lx IProv(x,A) 
(iii-2) ~3Jx IProv(x,A) =- ~V M M I= A 
(iii-3) ~[V. M M I= A and ~ 31x IProv(x,A)J. 
Other forms results from intuitionistic interpretation of quantifiers: 
(iv) ~ 31x IProv(x,A) ==> :BM M f--iA 
( v) ~ 31 x !Prov ( x , -,A ) = 3l M M I-= A 
(iv) does not imply (v) trivially, because 
Af I= -;7 A => Af f A does not hold. 
We call these forms (8) 
(i) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
( V) 
Strong completeness 
Weak completeness 
Counter-example (CE-) completeness 
Satisfiability of the irrefutable. 
2.1.1. Although in the case of weak completness the effectiveness of 
implication is abandoned, establishing weak-completeness is amply 
sufficient for the intended purpose of completeness (9). 
2,1.2, The interes is further focussed to weak completeness by Godel's 
discovery reported in Kreisel [62]: strong completeness (for the 
negative fragment) implies 
(*) ,,3n An ➔ 3n An for every p.r. predicate A. 
Interest in stronf completeness reduces consequently to weak complete-
ness and(*), If(*) holds then, .since Prov is a p.r. predicate,weak 
completeness implies strong completeness; while if(*) is refuted, 
then so is strong completeness of I. 
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2.2. Other variants are of minor or no interest, as a consequence of 
the following observations: 
2.2.1. The metamathematicsl predicate ProvT is intended to be decidable 
for any intuitionistic theory T. Therefore, variants in which 
:llx lProv. (x,A) is replaced by :llx·~~!Prov(x,A) do not have to be considered. 
2.2.2. The limited interest in strong completeness, following 2.1,1 
and 2.1,2, reduces the interest in variants stronger than strong-com-
pleteness, in which a weaker form of validity~ ~M M p A appears (not 
to mention difficulties of interpretation, like those of 1.4.4). 
2,2,3, The interest in weaker validity VM ~~ M I= A is completely 
eliminated by the equivalence of this form (1,2.4) to "IBM M 1='"1,A, 
A completeness result using this form would lead to the absurd im-
plication 
3lx IProv(x,,.A) ==:> (soundness) 
VIM M I= - - A =;. 
-:=, VIM ~~ M I= A 
(by the assumed completeness)~ 3lx IProv(x,A). 
2.2.4. If one takes in the provability-side of some formulation of 
completeness some classical:..variant of A, e.g. -,,A, one does not get 
the intended completeness result for the whole of I. 
2.3. Considering incompleteness, we should distinguish between a strong 
(local) form, by which a formula conflicting completeness can actually 
be constructed, 
(i) 31A{[VM M I= A] and ~ 3tx IProv(x,A)}, 
and a weaker (global) form, 
( ii ) ~VIA ~ {[ VM M I= A J and ~ 3Jx IProv(x,A)}. 
The result of §4 below is of the second kind. 
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II. Technical results 
3, Completeness of fragments of I 
3,0. By a completeness-result for a fragment F c I we mean one for 
which the range of the parameter A in 2.1 is F. ~rovI is not modified 
to E>rovF. 
3,1. Let¢: L t--)- L satisfy the following conditions: p p 
(i) ~A 3x Provc(x,rA7 ) ➔ 3y ProvI(Y,'¢A..,). 
Hence ¢G c I and¢ is a translation of C into I. 
(ii) f-c A ➔ ¢A 
(iii) ~ ¢A ➔ A 
(iv) ~ $[A+B] ➔ (¢A+¢B) 
(v) ¢ is structural, that is: 
¢[A(})J <I) X ¢A where Pis some predicate-letter not 
appearing in A. 
Conclusions: 
3, 1.1. By (ii) and (iv): (vi) Jr ¢[-,A] ➔ ,¢A: 
Hence 
➔ ,¢[,A] 
➔ -,-,A 
(by (ii) and (iv)) 
(by (vi)) 
(by (ii)) 
~¢A ➔ A, and by (ii) 
(vii) fc ¢A.-+ A 
whence also 
,, 
(viii)½ ¢A~ ¢¢A. 
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3,1.2. ¢ can be naturally extended to 
in the following way. 
PI e LP can be interpreted primitive-recursively to enumera~e all 
equations. As a result we get a translation(*) of LA into LP. 
If for A E LP we have via this translation ~CA A* then 
* * where A0 , ••• ,A is the list of instances of axioms of CA used in the 
* n proof of A. 
By (vii) 1-c ¢A0 ➔ (¢A 1 ➔ •• ,(¢An➔¢A)) ..• ) 
* * and since A0 , ••• ,An are also axioms of IA 
~IA[¢A] * - * or I-IA ¢A 
( ¢ is structural, therefore [¢A]* ~ ¢A*) 
and in fact 
r *7 ( r- *7 1-cA 3x ProvCA(x, A ) ➔ 3y ProvIA y, ¢A ). 
Conditions (ii)-(viii) are transferred from¢ to$ trivially. 
3,1.3. By (vii) every Mc LA (cf. §0.4) is classically-equivalent to 
0 _ ... 
anM c¢LA. 
3,2. Theorem (Kreisel [58]): Let¢: Ip i--+ rp satisfy conditions 
(i) - (v) of 4.1, and be such that ~:!lx 1Prov(x,¢A) is expressible in 
- A A ¢LA' for every A e LP, by - say - R • Then ¢C is CE-complete. 
Proof: In CA 
A R ---+ -i 3x ProvI(x,r¢A-,) 
--+ ...., 3 x Prov C ( x , ,--A 7) 
- ..., 3 x Provc(x,1 As') 
M 
- -, A s 
(by ( i)) 
(cf. o.4) 
(by Hilbert-Bernays [39], 
pp, 243-253, and by 4.1,3 
assume M c ¢LA) 
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(by (vii)) 
A - M Hence: (*)~CAR ➔, ~A 
and by ( i) , (.iv) ~IA $RA ➔ 4> -, 4>AM • 
... 
Since RAE~ A this yields by (viii) 
I- A - M IA R ➔ -, ~[A J 
and by (v), using Mc L A 
I A M 
rIA R ➔ [-i~A] 
To justify the proof in intuitionistic metamathematics, note that by 
the nature of the proof of(*) one has in fact for some n 
and by full use of (i) the following steps provides p.r. instructions 
to compute some n0 s.t. 
3,2.1. The Hilbert-Bernays construction still holds in exactly the 
same way for L i.e.: a uniform construction yields for every A EL 
Pf' Pf 
an M s.t. 
where Mis a primitive-recursively defined arithmetical model of If, 
that is: predicate-letters are interpreted as arithmetical relations, and 
function-letters as p.r. functions. 
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... 
3,3. In fact the description of M for every A EL involves only the 
Pf 
interpretation of the formal symbols (predicates and functions) actually 
appearing in A. Since these are p.r. defined and finite in number, we 
can arithmetize by a kind of Godel-enumeration the series of models 
constructed. 
The full power of the result above appears then in the form (in obvious 
shorten notation) 
(*) 
where RA express intuitionistically in ~LAf the improvability of ~A in 
... ... 
IAf, A E LPf and~: LPF ~ LPf as above. 
. . . . rRA [ JM 1 . It is legitimate to write here ➔ -,~A since 
(i) ~ is p.r., therefore 
is p.r. 
(ii) exactly like the procedure for obtaining Godel's substitution 
functions, one has that 
r M, 
1-+ [-,~A] is p.r. 
3,4. Examples 
3.4.1. (cf. Leivant [71] for notation and an outline of proof), Define 
a translation~ by 
,..A·-= A( Sa) 'I' ,. .,., .,., µ , Df. 
where f3 is the complete list of ].i E SA with the following properties: 
( i) Vfx. B. E SA 
i i 
(ii) ].i is in the range of a disjunction or an existential quantifier. 
(iii) s;. does not have a clear bar free of 
i 
x .• 
i 
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(iv) If B. < B. with B. satisfying (i) - (iii), then some v or 3 
J 1 J 
occurs between B. and B. in SA. 
1 J 
3. 4. 2. ( special case of 3. 4. 1). Define <P by <PA XDf -,-,A(-,~S) where 13 is 
the complete list of B. s.t. Vx.B. is a subformula of A. 
. -1 1 1 
3.4.3. GGdel's translation (derived from 3,4.2. cf. Leivant [71] §7). 
3. 4. 4. ( subca.se of 3. 4 .2): The class of formulas of the form 
Vx -,A (with A open). 
k 
... 
3,5, Invariance under negation of <jJLP is necessary for the proof above 
(3.2): The class of negations of prenex formulas is the image of·a 
translation satisfying all the conditions of 3.2 except (v) (cf. Kreisel 
[58] or Leivant [71] §9), but an elegant argument of Kreisel [58] 
(th. 6), shows that for such a formula A _ 
cannot be proved in IA for any arithmetical model M. 
3.6. A simple argument (due to Kreisel [61] pp. 13-14) shows that 
example 3,4.4 can be generalized to obtain CE-completeness (relative to 
arithmetical models and proved within IA) for the more general class 
of formulas of the form -,Q-,A, where Q is a "block" of consecutive 
quantifiers and A is open • 
.... 
For A€ LA' if ~IA Vx3y A(x,y), then one has p.r. instructions to get 
for any given number n a number m s.t. ~IA A(n,m). Hence 
~IAf Vx A(x,fx) with a p,r. f. More generally: 
Since IAf is a conservative extention of IA, one has that. 
\+IA -,Vx1'Sy 1 ... V~3yk -,A(x1, •.. ,~ ,y 1 , ..• ,Yk) 
implies 
By 3,4.4 then, there is a p.r.-defined arithmetical model M s.t. 
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and hence even 
3,6.1. The same method can be combined with 3,4.1 (instead of 3,4.4) to 
give CE-completeness of a larger class:that of stable formulas A 
(i.e. , s. t. -,.,A➔A) , for which every block of quantifiers has a stable 
matrix: 
In fact it is enough to assume that only the blockgQ. with the following 
l 
properties have a stable matrix 
( i) 
(ii) 
Q. contains a universal quantifier. 
l 
Q. is in th.e range of an existential quantifier. 
l 
(iii) If Qi< Qj (in the natural order of SA) with Qi satisfying 
(i)-(ii), then some v or3 occurs between Qi and Qj in SA. 
3,7. Schematic strong completeness relative to a kind of free-choice-
sequences is established for the class of prenex-formulas of LP in 
Kreisel [58a] §7, The weak completeness shown there gives strong-com-
pleteness, since this class is decidable (Rasiowa-Sikorski [54]), whence 
for every prenex A. 
A subcase of this is the intuitionistic propositional calculus. 
4. Inc0mpleteness under Church's thesis 
4.o. The following is a negative result of the kind mentioned in 1.4.5. 
It was announced in Kreisel [70]. We use a result in recursion theory 
due to Jockusch [70], instead of that of Mastowski proposed in Kreisel 
[70]. 
,. 
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4. 1 •. The essence of the argument is roughly this: the species of valid 
(in recursive interpretation of function-symbols) formulas V c LPf .1s 
of great complexity: it is not r.e. (in fact - it is I~-complete). 
Hence V cannot be equal to the species of provable formulas, which is 
r.e. 
The complexity of Vis due to the power of expression implicite in the 
-
metamathematical assertion A€ V (A€ Lpf). Such an assertion enables 
one to express the (non-) existence of a recursive i.p.s. in any p.r. 
describable species of i.p.s., and thus a certain form of separation 
between recursive and non-recursive i.p.s. 
Instead of V, one can use in this argument V n F with F any r.e. species 
of formulas. We take F to be the class of formulas asserting that the 
projection of the function 'f' in some p.r. binary tree is not infinite, 
This is a structural definition, and hence Fis in fact p.r. 
Assuming Church's thesis V n Fis then the class of formulas asserting 
that some p.r. binary tree has no infinite recursive branch. A lemma 
from recursion theory shows this class to be non-r.e. in a constructive 
way, which concludes the proof. 
4.2. Consider the conjunction Z of the .closure of the following formulas 
("axioms") for the predicate-symbols P~, P~, P~ which we designate 
by E, Z, S: 
E(x,x), E(x,y) & E(x,z) ➔ E(y,z) 
E(x,y) & Z(x) ➔ Z(y); Z(x) & Z(y) ➔ E(x,y) 
E(x,y) & S(x,z) ➔ S(y,z); E(x,y) & S(z,x) ➔ S(z,y) 
S(x,y) & S(x,z) ➔ E(y,z) 
3xZ(x); Vx3yS(x ,Y) 
,[S(x,y)&Z(y)J. 
We assume that every model of Z contains a constructively - specified 
submodel which is constructively isomorphic to the natural numbers, 
with E interpreted as equality, Z as zero and Sas successor relations, 
,. 
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4,3, Let T be a p.r. binary tree, i.e. its characteristic function,, 
for which 
Tx ~ ,x = 0 
has a p.r. definition. 
Hence, there is a sequence of functions , 0 , ••• ,,n s.t. ,. (O,:_i,:_n) is J. 
either (1) ,.(n) = 0 
1 
or ( 2) , . ( n) = n+ 1 
J. 
or (3) 
or (4) 
T.(n1 , ••• ,n ) J. r. 
J. 
,.(n
1
, ••• ,n) 
J. ri 
= n (1 < q < r.) q - - J. 
-r.(Tk (n1, ... ,n ), ... ,, (n1, ... ,n )) J 1 rk1 kl rkl 
with j,k1, ... ,k1 < i 
or (5) 
{
T.(m,O) = 
,: (m,n+1) 
T. (m) 
J 
and ,v,, 
,.,. n 
= ,k(m,n,,i(m,n)) with j,k < i 
Assuming the intended interpretation of E, Zand S we can, using these 
predicate-symbols, define T by a mimic of the definition of,: 
Let F. (O<i<n) be one of the following, according to the case for the 
J. --
definition of,. above. 
J. 
(1) Z(y) + P.(x,y) 
J. 
or (2) S(x,y) + P.(x,y) 
1 
or ( 3) 
or ( 4) 
P.(x1, •.. ,x ,x.) J. r J 
A Pk (x,, ... ,xt,yh) 
1 <h<l -n 
(1 ,:_ q ,:_ r) 
& P/y1, ... ,y1 ,y) + Pi(x1, ... ,xr,y) 
or (5) [Z(z) & P.(x,y) + P.(x,z,y)J & 
J J. 
[Pi(x,y,z) & S(y,k) & Pk(x,y,z,v) + Pi(x,u,v)J. 
Let now PT(p) be the closure, except for p, of 
z & A 
1<i<n 
F. & [Z(z) + P (p,z)J 
i n 
& A 
1<i<n 
A [E(u,v) & Pi(x1, •.• ,xj_ 1,u,xj+1, •.• ,xr.+1) 1<j<r.+1 i 
- - J. 
+ P.(x1 , ... ,x. 1,v,x. 1, ••• )], J. J- J+ 
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4.4. If PT(p) means p ET, then 
.FT ~Df -,Vx PT(fx) E LPf 
means that the projection on T of the function g s.t. f(x) = g(x) is 
not infinite. 
If, under Church's thesis, FT _is valid, the_n g ranges ever all recur-
sive functions, and hence every recursive branch of Tis not infinite. 
Since F =Df.{FT I Tis a p.r. binary tree} is structurally recognizable, 
we have th_e situation described in 4. 1 . 
4.5. Using Jockusch [70] we show now that F n V (the class of valid 
formulas of Funder.Church's thesis) is intuitionistically non-r.e. 
Notation: w the th set fixed enumeration. X. e r.e. in some 
e 
T ,J the th binary tree some:fixed enumeration. 
"' 
e p.r. in 
e 
4.5.1. Lemma. There is a p.r. function h, s.t. the infinite branches of 
T are exactly the characteristic functions of the sets S s.t. h(e0 ,e1) 
Proof. Define (using the notation of Kleene-Vesley [65]} 
(e
0
,e1 ) T (x) ~f Seq(x) & V(i<lhx) (x)i < 2 & 
V(i<lhx) {[3(z<x) T(e0 ,i,z) + (x). = 1 i 
& 3 ( z <x) T ( e 1 , i , z) ➔ ( x \ = 0] • 
(e0 ,e 1) The first two conjuncts assure T to be a set of binary sequence-
numbers (the tree-property x * n ET==:> x ET is implied by the third 
conjunct). 
The last main conjunct express that x cannot be denied to represent the 
initial sequence of an acil.equate S by computations of length~ x. 
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(e0,e1) 
The bounds on all quantifiers assure T to be p.r., and the 
s-m-n theorem implies the existence of the desired p.r. function h. 
4.5.2. Lemma. There is a p.r. function k s.t. 
W finite 
e ~ Wk(e) finite 
We infinite ~ Wk( e) = IN 
Proof. Define 
k is a p.r. function by the s-m-n theorem. 
4,5,3, Lemma 
F =Df,{e I Te has effectively no infinite recursive branch} 
is (2~-) completely-productive (and therefore not-r.e.). 
Proof. Let A, B be fixed, disjoint, effectively-inseparable r.e. sets, 
and let 
r =Df,{e I we infinite}. 
Define: w - Anw • w g0(e) -Df. k(e)' g 1 (e) 
f(e) =Df. h(g0(e),g 1 (e)), 
where k, hare as above, and f is p.r. (by the s-m-n theorem). 
By 4,5.1-2. 
,. 
w 
e 
finite and W ( ) are finite and disjoint g1 e 
W infinite==;, W = A and W ( ) = B 
e g0(e) g1 e 
=:> f(e) E F effectively. 
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Hence I= IF, and since I is (effectively-) productive (Rogers [67] 
m 
§7 ,3 p,84 and §7 .4), IF is also (effectively-) productive (Rogers [67] 
§7,3 th. V(b)), and hence (effectively-) completely-productive. 
4.6. The constructive non-r.e, of IF (by complete-productivity) of 
4.5,3 yields the desired intuitionistic result: 
Let p be a (t~tal) recursive functions for the complete-productivity 
of IF, 
p(e) E (W ~IF) u (IF~W) or 
e e 
,[p(e) E W & p(e) E IF] & ,[p(e) 4 W & p(e) 4 IF]. 
e e 
Int ui ti oni.st ic ally 
(***) 
p(e) E W = 3x3y[T(e,x,y) & p(e) = U(y)J 
e 
p(e) E IF = Vu{Vx,Vz,T(u,x,z) ➔ 
,Va [V(i<lha),Vy,[T(u,i,y) & (a).= U(y)] ➔ T ( )(a)]} 
l p e 
Substituting(**) and(***) in(*), the existential qu~ntifier of(**) 
is everywhere negated in(*), therefore the classical provability of(*) 
implies its provability in intuitionistic recursion theory. 
Now, if IF= Wt for some t; then 
contradiction by the first conjunct of(*); 
contradiction by the second conjunct. 
4.7.1. The non-completeness result for If can be rewritten to represent 
non-schematic-completeness (with recursive functions as parameters) of 
.... 
I. Instead of writing PT(f(x)) E Lpf we can write PT(f;x) with fas a 
a metam.athe~atical parameter, which - in a model of z - is used by 
PT(x) & V(i<lhx) f(i) = :(x\, 
where the interpretation of lhx and (x). depends on that of E, Zand S. 
l 
Schematic validity reads then 
,. 
(Vrec,f) ,Vx PT(f;x). 
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4.7.2. This result can be considerably strengthen to more significant 
para.meters of schema, e.g. the infinite proceeding. sequences of the 
system CS of Kreisel-Troelstra [70]. If 'a' is a letter for lawless 
sequences, and 'a' - for lawlike functions, then schematic completness 
of I with (CS-) ips's as parameters follows from the fact that in CS 
Vaf(a) .+--+ Vaf(a) for negative F; 
and here F(a) x ,Vx PT(a;x). 
(*) is a straightforward consequence of Va-,,Ja [a=a] (Kreisel-Troelstra 
[70] §6.2.4) which means that it is absurd to identify an arbitrary 
(lawless) ips as non-lawlike. 
4.7.3, For the lawless sequences of Kreisel [58a], which obey fewer 
axioms than those of CS, the non-schematic-completeness follows already 
from Godel's construction described in Kreisel [62], which shows that 
for a from the full binary spread weak schematic completeness implies 
(G) Va -,-,:ln A(n,a)-+ -,-,•fo3n A(n,a) 
for every p.r. predicate A. But the lawless sequences of Kreisel [58a] 
demonstrately do not satisfy (G), since (remark 7.4 there) 
Va-,Vna(n) = 0 but ,Va3na(n) = 0. 
4.8. On the other hand the results above are obviously adaptable to 
extensions of I which are consistent with Church's thesis. 
This means that Markov's schema 
(M) Vx[AxY-,Ax] & ,,:lxAx -+ 3xAx, 
which is consistent with Church's thesis, does not imply completeness. 
Hence also 
(G+) Va ,., 3nA(n,a) -+ Va3nA(n,a) 
which is a special case of (M), does not imply weak-completeness, 
although implied by strong-completeness. (G) itself, however, does imply 
we~k completeness (Dyson-Kreisel [61]), and is therefore equivalent to it. 
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Remarks 
(1) In the language of propositional calculus the notion of plurality 
is absent. In LPf the function-symbols are also formal letters. · 
(2) Compare the following definition of Cantor: "A set is any collection 
into a whole of definite and separate objects". (Cantor: "Contribution 
to the Foundations of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers"). 
(3) If one attacks the classical notion of semantics in a non-formalistic 
way, there is no reason even then that the general notions of semantics 
can be described in set-theoretical terms without some essential res-
triction. The possibility to do it is in fact a corollary_of the classical 
completeness theorem, as was pointed out by Kreisel [64] §1.83, and 
explained again in Kreisel [65]. 
(4) Kreisel does it in [62], although he mentions there indirectly the 
theory implicite in every model: "A is .valid, i.e. for all species R 
there is a 'proof' of~"· This distinction, which disappears in later 
writings of Kreisel does not play a role in the abstract theory of con-
structions developed in [62], since this theory is intended to deal with 
those "proofs" impredicatively. For a result in the direction of soundness 
the~e is no harm in this impredicativity (which is just a formalization 
of Heyting's explanation on the meaning of the logical symbols in in-
tuitionistic mathematics). This, however, becomes an essential limitation 
when one touches completeness, i.e.: the problem of exhaustion of 
validity, which must involve the actual meaning of these proofs, As 
Church puts it ([56] fn. 143), to speak abstractly about semantics can 
belong (if we like) to "theoretical syntax", and semantics begins by 
fixing the meaning of particular interpretations. 
Kreisel recognizes indeed indirectly the limits of the impredicative 
theory of [62] for actual semantical problems: "Undoubtly, the most 
important open problem is to give a foundation for the introduction of 
species by means of (generalized) inductive definitions, for which the 
corresponding principles of proof by induction can be derived". 
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(5) This distinctien was pointed-out already by Kreisel [65] for 
classical meta.mathematics. In §2 there, 'Val a' stands for the "intuitive 
validity" 0f a (in fact, "an assertion on a logical basis"), to dis-
tinguish it fr0m 'Va' - "a is valid in all set-theoretical structu:i;-es". 
It is the second notion whose problematics in the intuitionistic case 
we analyse. 
(6) This is similar in a way to the principle of continuity in in-
tuitionistic analysis. There, however, the modification applies to 
objects (functionals) specified by existential quantifiers, and results 
therefore in a strengthening of assertions; here, on the other hand, 
it applies to the range implicite in a universal quantifier, and it is 
a weakening. On limited validity - compare also Kreisel [58], p,318. 
(7) A more formal aspect of the situation: the uncompleted objects 
cannot be incorporated in the description of a fixed model, since they 
do not satisfy condition (2) of 2,5 bel0w. 
(8) The terminology of (i) and (iii) is of Kreisel [58]. Kreisel mentions 
there also a uniform completeness 
'IA :BM [M f A =:> 3:lx IProv(x,A)J. 
This is the kind of result of Hilbert~Bernays [39], which can be applied 
to fragments of I (cf. §4 below). However, it is different from (i)-(v), 
It is stronger classically than (i), and the formula meta-symbol 'A' 
must be quantified here (in (i)-(v) it is a parameter). 
(9) Remark 2,3 of Kreisel [58] which disaccords with 2.1,1 seems to be 
erroneous: Since ProvI is a~ arithmetical predicate 
and even the converse holds. 
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